The gradual disappearance of tropical animal species due to overhunting and habitat loss represents a major risk for biodiversity and tropical rainforest conservation efforts. Uncontrolled hunting and other human-induced declines in diversity and abundance of seed-dispersing animal species might also negatively affect biomass carbon storage, which could undermine climate change mitigation efforts. We study how the Ecuadorian Socio Bosque conservation incentive programme [Programa Socio Bosque -PSB] addresses animal species conservation and engages with local communities. Drawing on official documents, as well as interviews and observations in four indigenous communities that participate in PSB, we discuss the role of local participation in conservation monitoring. The PSB's incentive and control approach has to some extent supported the establishment and financing of forest monitoring systems in indigenous communities. However, we argue that PSB in its current design exerts a conservation gap because it does not include animal species diversity and abundance as important components for successful long-term forest conservation. Supporting a bottom-up participatory monitoring methodology for locally-based conservation action can increase the existing positive conservation attitudes among community members. We provide specific examples of how animal species conservation and participatory monitoring can be combined and carried out.
Introduction
Biodiversity loss is a global environmental challenge (Cardinale et al. 2012 ) and a planetary boundary that humanity has already surpassed (Rockstrom et al. 2009 ). Various approaches to tackle the main drivers of biodiversity loss, such as habitat destruction and overharvesting, have emerged (Venter et al. 2009; Wunder & Wertz-Kanounnikoff 2009; Vatn et al. 2011) . Particularly the ecosystem service framework influenced the way biodiversity is valued, because it introduced new arguments for including biodiversity in economic measurements and decision-making (Turner & Daily 2007; TEEB 2010) . From an instrumental perspective, biodiversity is important for human well-being and the provision of ecosystem services (Costanza et al. 1997; Daily et al. 1997; Balmford et al. 2002; MEA 2005; Chan et al. 2007 ). However, many scholars caution against the economic logic that instrumentalizes the conservation of biodiversity (McCauley 2006; Spash 2009; Gómez-Baggethun & Ruiz-Pérez 2011) .
Globally, ecosystems services are becoming included in political and economic decision-making (TEEB 2010), despite vigorous discussions on the application and sensibility of the market-based logic (Norgaard 2010) . One approach is payments for ecosystem services (PES) schemes, which are an attempt to internalize externalities and are increasingly implemented from the local to the *Corresponding author. Email: torsten.krause@lucsus.lu.se international level (Pagiola et al. 2005; Pattanayak et al. 2010) .
Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) plus the conservation, enhancement of carbon stocks and the sustainable management of forests represents a PES scheme at the international level with the basic idea that developed countries provide financial incentives to developing countries for reducing forest loss and degradation, thus mitigating climate change (Angelsen et al. 2009; Corbera 2012) . Several technical, political and social challenges remain and need to be overcome for REDD+ to work. Biodiversity conservation receives an increasing attention, alongside improving socio-economic conditions for local and indigenous people (Paoli et al. 2010; Cerbu et al. 2011; Thompson et al. 2011) . Achieving positive, social and environmental benefits constitute significant side objectives in the multiple benefit rhetoric of REDD+ (Brown et al. 2008 ). However, animal species diversity and abundance are only implicitly accounted for under the broad term of biodiversity in the official REDD+ documentation (UNFCCC 2011 (UNFCCC , 2012 . Where monitoring is carried out, it mainly focuses on vegetation cover, biomass carbon, and baseline carbon emissions (Harris et al. 2012) .
We present the Ecuadorian Socio Bosque programme (Span.: Programa Socio Bosque -PSB) as a case of an economic instrument based on the theory of incentives. Landowners who agree to forego land-use changes, protect native ecosystems and biodiversity, and thus provide ecosystem services, are financially rewarded. Thus, PSB aims to foster a desirable change, such as conservation, without coercion or stricter law enforcement (see e.g., Tietenberg 1990; McNeely 1996; Grant 2006; Pirard 2012) . The PSB is implemented, managed and largely financed by the government of Ecuador and focuses exclusively on individually or collectively owned land (MAE 2011a) . Nevertheless, PSB is not a PES scheme in the strict sense, as incentive levels are not based on service delivery or opportunity costs (Krause & Loft forthcoming) .
This article investigates how PSB addresses animal species conservation and engages indigenous communities in forest and species protection efforts in the Ecuadorian Amazon. The starting point of our article is the importance of biodiversity, in particular animal species diversity and abundance as an essential component to maintain ecosystem functions and thus to sustain stores of forest carbon (Wilkie et al. 2011; Phelps et al. 2012) . Firstly, we analyse how animal species diversity is incorporated into the design and implementation of PSB. Secondly, we present findings on incentive use in 31 indigenous communities in the Amazon. Finally, based on four selected Kichwa communities, we show to what extent forest monitoring and rules for hunting are established. We look at the perception of biodiversity among members of the four communities, as their backing and acceptance for any conservation management and monitoring is a basic requirement for success. The findings we present provide insights into the working of PSB and how participatory forest and species monitoring can combine PSB's social and environmental objectives, which can inform other conservation projects that aim to include local stakeholders in conservation activities.
Ecological links -animal species and biomass carbon
The local and regional loss of tropical forest megafauna has severe effects on key tropical forest plant species and their regeneration, which in turn affect forest resilience and potentially the capacity of tropical forests to store and sequester carbon (Bunker et al. 2005; Muller-Landau 2007; Wright et al. 2007; Stork 2010; Cardinale et al. 2012) . Most tree species in tropical forest regions are animal-dispersed (Howe & Smallwood 1982) and studies on the relation of tree and animal diversity in tropical rainforests illustrate the ecological dynamics between modes of seed dispersal (Howe & Smallwood 1982; Seidler & Plotkin 2006; Datta & Rawat 2008) , tree diversity (Pitman et al. 2001; Terborgh et al. 2002) , tree abundance Fragoso et al. 2003 ) and the impact of human hunting on seed dispersers and seed predators (Wright et al. 2000; Muller-Landau 2007; Stoner et al. 2007; Wright et al. 2007 ). Studies in Peru indicate a positive relationship between the abundance of seed-dispersing animals and tree-species composition (Terborgh et al. 2008) . However, due to the complexity of tree-animal interactions in tropical rainforests, the impact of hunting on biomass carbon storage remains uncertain (Martin & Thomas 2011) .
Large vertebrate species (e.g., large-bodied primates, tapirs) are most vulnerable because they are preferred by hunters (Franzen 2006; Peres & Palacios 2007) . A disappearance of lowland tapir can lead to negative impact on plant diversity and a shift tree community composition (Tobler et al. 2010) , which in the long run reduces the resilience of the ecosystem (Muller-Landau 2007; Wang et al. 2007; Wright et al. 2007) . Carbon storage capacity in tropical forests is positively linked to future animal species composition (Bunker et al. 2005) , but the intact fauna needed to perpetuate the plant community of tropical forests has already been widely disrupted (Redford 1992; Peres & Dolman 2000; Fa et al. 2002; Galetti et al. 2013) .
Because certain taxonomic groups play a disproportionately large role in the provision of ecosystem services, such as seed dispersal, conservation needs to take critical functional diversity into account (Perrings et al. 2010 ). If changes in species composition and species extinction in the Amazon continue, a 34% decrease in carbon storage is possible (Bunker et al. 2005) . Thus, forests that receive full protection of their vegetation cover, such as in PSB, could over decades still experience a decreased carbon stock through the ripple effects of degradation, bushmeat hunting, noise disturbance, pollution, fragmentation and edge effects on species interactions (Brodie & Gibbs 2009 ). Bunker et al. (2005) conclude that the uncertainties associated with the nature of extinction and the variety of ecosystem services may best be served with the maximization of the species pool.
The Ecuadorian Amazon
Ecuador has 2 out of 25 globally identified biodiversity hotspots and a high rate of endemism, making it an exceptionally diverse country for animal and plant species (Mittermeier et al. 1998; Myers et al. 2000; Pitman et al. 2002; Bass et al. 2010; Stern & Kernan 2011) . There are 14 recognized indigenous nationalities in Ecuador, 9 of which live in the Amazon region (Mecham 2001 ). An estimated 65% of Ecuador's forest area is under indigenous ownership (ITTO 2009; Bertzky et al. 2010; Chíu & Carríon 2011) and about 20% (approx. 48,000 km 2 ) of the land area is protected (MAE 2010). However, Ecuador has one of the highest deforestation rates in South America (FAO 2011; MAE 2011b) and the Amazon region has been shaped by extractive activities and colonization for decades (Barbieri et al. 2009 ).
Bushmeat from the rainforest is an important source of protein and remains a preferred food item for many people in the Amazon. It is part of indigenous cultural beliefs and traditions, and, when sold, provides economic income (Franzen 2006; Sirén 2012) . Although commercial bushmeat hunting is illegal in Ecuador (MAE 2004) , it is still traded from remote forest areas to urban centres in the Amazon and proceeds from sales benefit primarily middlemen, rather than local hunters (Painter et al. 2008; Suárez et al. 2009 ).
The Socio Bosque Programme
The PSB was established in September 2008 to meet nature conservation objectives of Ecuador's National Development Plan (Span.: Plan del Buen Vivir) (SENPLADES 2009; de Koning et al. 2011 ). Since its implementation, PSB has gradually moved away from the idea of REDD+ that requires the measurement of the net amount of avoided deforestation (MAE 2008; Chíu & Carríon 2011) . However, PSB is linked to the Ecuadorian REDD+ programme's incentive policies and could benefit from future REDD+ financing (MAE 2012b; Schmidt et al. 2012 ). The PSB is considered a pilot project to inform future REDD+ proposals in Ecuador (MAE 2012b; USAID 2012) .
The main objectives of PSB as defined by the Ministry of Environment are (i) to protect native ecosystems thus helping to conserve biodiversity, protect soils and provide hydrological services; (ii) to reduce deforestation thus mitigating climate change; (iii) to improve living conditions among rural populations and (iv) include up to 4 million hectares of native ecosystems and to benefit up to 1 million people (de Koning et al. 2011; MAE 2012a) . Since its implementation more than 880,000 hectares, mostly tropical forests, have been enrolled in PSB (PSB 2011) . The majority of conservation areas are located in the territories of indigenous communities who hold relatively vast and largely well-preserved areas in the Amazon region and are therefore particularly attractive for inclusion into PSB (Figure 1) . The Kichwa are one of the largest Amazonian indigenous groups and most communities participating in PSB belong to this group.
At the time of writing this article, PSB included only native and undisturbed ecosystems, comprising all types of natural forests and secondary forests that started regrowth before 1990. Participation is voluntary, but once joined landowners must comply with a number of terms for 20 years. These include complete restriction of any land-use change; to report any changes to the area's vegetation cover, either natural (e.g., from fire or storm) or through invasion or illegal logging by third parties, not to hunt for commercial purposes and to adequately mark the conservation area (MAE 2008) . Incentives are transferred in two payments per year and the amount is based on the amount of hectares and type of ecosystems protected. Furthermore, the terms of the PSB conservation agreement require an investment plan that details how the incentives will be used by the participants (de Koning et al. 2011; MAE 2012a) . Indigenous communities in the Amazon own land collectively and they are required to devise yearly investment plans in a democratic, inclusive and transparent way.
Monitoring of the vegetation cover in the area under conservation (abbreviated as AUC throughout this article) is carried out remotely, but PSB retains the right to send its staff to conduct on-site visits (Coral 2011) . At the national level, one team (5 people) verifies the factual conservation of the vegetation on-site while another team (2 people) verifies and monitors the AUC through remote sensing and with available aerial photographs and cartography.
Methods
The research is based on in-depth fieldwork carried out from January to March 2012. We present empirical data which are compiled from governmental documents and from semi-structured interviews with NGO and government representatives. Based on communal investment plans and financial reports for 2011, and when available for 2012, we analysed incentive spending for 31 out of 35 collective agreements in the Amazon that participated in PSB at the time of writing. Four agreements were excluded, because they were signed with PSB at the end of 2011 and lacked financial reports and investment plans at the time of writing. The 31 agreements combined cover 581,000 hectares of rainforest, more than half of the protected areas in PSB by the end of 2011. All except one agreement are with indigenous communities from seven different ethnicities.
We conducted in-depth interviews in four indigenous Kichwa communities which are situated in the Amazon provinces of Napo, Orellana and Pastaza. The communities were selected based on time of participation in PSB, minimum 1 year, thus having received at least one round of incentives, and the possibility to get access to and permission of the communities to conduct the study. They are labelled as communities A, B, C and D, and together constitute 20% of all PSB areas (as of 2011). We purposefully selected and interviewed 14 community members who are designated community forest guards or community leaders. Each community was visited for several days during fieldwork from January to March 2012, allowing also for direct personal observations. Community assemblies for publicly displaying incentive use have become mandatory in order to get the approval of the next transfer of the incentive. During these assemblies, we held participatory workshops with the designated community forest guards (depending on the community, the number of participants varied from 4 to 10) in three communities. The objective of these workshops was to identify existing challenges to the community's current conservation strategy and to develop maps that provide spatial information and identify vulnerable areas in order to support future monitoring. Our presence in these workshops and visits to the conservation areas allowed us to validate our interview results and to gather additional data from observations. The qualitative interview data were transcribed and quotations were selected to highlight and show reoccurring themes of the interviews. In the interviews, we identified the knowledge respondents have regarding PSB, if there is a monitoring system for the conservation area in place, and how monitoring is carried out. Furthermore, we asked interviewees about the existence of rules for hunting in their communities, if sanctions are applied when rules are violated, what species they use for which purposes and how hunting has changed in the last years. We further inquired if respondents perceived an increase in game species abundance since their communities participate in PSB and what they think about alternatives to substitute hunting with aquaculture or the breeding of game in small farms.
Results

Addressing animal species diversity in the Socio Bosque programme design
Out of 16 obligations in the operating manual of PSB, 12 are related to biodiversity conservation (MAE 2012a). Participants have to comply with these obligations to receive the incentives (Table 1) . The operating manual does not include guidelines or oblige participating communities to conduct monitoring of the AUC. Workshops that are intended to support community forest guards are coordinated and organized by provincial authorities of the Ministry of Environment (Coral 2011) , but at the time of writing there was no evidence that workshops have been organized. There is no specific inclusion of animal species Table 1 . Obligations which specifically address conservation as stipulated in the PSB operating manual (MAE 2012a). The presented obligations apply only for participants with forest cover. Non-forest ecosystems, such as páramo, have different obligations. conservation and the only obligation put forward in the operating manual is the prohibition to hunt for commercial or recreational purposes (see Table 1 ).
Contractual conservation obligations in the AUC
Incentive use in 31 communal conservation agreements in the Amazon
Based on investment plans and financial reports of 31 communities participating in PSB in the Amazon, we analysed communal incentive spending (see Table 2 ). The majority of funds were dedicated to social and cultural projects (for example, health care, education and scholarships for students), followed by expenditures for organizational purposes (such as administration, travel and compensation for leaders). Economic productive projects, for example, the purchase of agricultural material (e.g., machetes, cacao seedlings) or ecotourism projects were funded with US$282,000 overall. The total spending for conservation activities is the smallest spending area with US$239,228 (18%). Included in conservation activities are salaries and equipment for forest guards and material costs for putting up signs along the conservation area borders. While one out of the assessed communities dedicated 100% of the incentive to conservation activities, five did not dedicate any of the incentives to conservation and used the incentives almost exclusively for social and cultural (N = 3), organizational (N = 1) or economic productive (N = 1) projects.
Calculating the average amount, each community dedicates to the four spending areas shows a different picture. Of the incentives, a community receives, on average 24% are spent on conservation-related activities (13% of which for forest guards). Each of the 31 communities spends on average 34% of the yearly incentives for social and cultural projects, an average of 22% of the communal incentives are spent on economic projects and 20% for organizational purposes (Table 2) .
Conservation and forest monitoring in four selected communities
In this section, we present findings on forest monitoring and conservation activities. With the exception of community C, all had some form of forest monitoring in place and forest guards were employed to patrol the conservation area in order to detect intrusions by third parties, illegal logging and land-use changes (see Table 3 ). Forest monitoring in community A and B was relatively well established. Both A and B have a monitoring system and a fixed team of forest guards who receive monthly payments to carry out the monitoring. Community C and D have comparatively large areas under conservation but no formalized method for forest monitoring in the AUC. Respondents stated that this is due to their remoteness, large size and the difficulty of access. Community D had forest guards assigned who carry out occasional border patrol activities on the river but did not reach the AUC. Both communities C and D have problems with neighbouring communities hunting in their territories, which is particularly interesting because one of the neighbouring communities in question also has large parts of their territory dedicated as a PSB conservation area.
Forest monitoring requires technical equipment and materials, especially for the large AUC's (such as GPS, tents, portable satellite radios) and represents a major spending area. Our workshop with forest guards in community D revealed that they lack equipment, boats and gasoline for patrolling the extensive community borders, while access to the AUC requires a walk of several hours. Moreover, forest guards told us that due to the geographical location of the AUC in community D, which is situated at the Peruvian border, river access from Peru facilitates poaching and logging by third parties in the AUC without the community being able to stop it. A military base with 400 soldiers is located on the territory of community D and the community occasionally supplies bushmeat to soldiers, who also hunt in both the Yasuni National Park and the community forest.
Our findings suggest that participation in PSB reinforces sanctions, e.g., for hunting or logging, which were previously established by the communities because the incentives are an additional motivation to increase compliance. In community B, a family was expelled from the community for excessive hunting and repeatedly violating the no-hunting policy. In community A, conflicts with neighbouring communities and hunters from outside have 
Local perceptions of biodiversity conservation
We asked designated community forest guards and community leaders about their perception of biodiversity conservation and hunting. Although all interviewees showed awareness about the role and importance of forest conservation, knowledge about the conservation status of selected animal species was generally limited.
Interviewees in communities C and D stated that excessive hunting in the past led to a decrease of game around the villages and hunters had to spend more time in order to encounter game. Emblematic species (such as the tapir, Salvin's curassow and peccaries) have been reduced or altogether disappeared from the more accessible forest areas closer to the settlements due to hunting pressure by community members and sometimes outsiders who infringe on the territory to hunt. ' The hunting grounds are far away from the community, it takes one day to arrive. There are not many animals left close by' (29-year-old male, community C) 'Conservation is good so that our children can see animals, such as the collared peccary, the tapir and the white-lipped peccary' (26-year-old male, community B) Interviewees in the four communities investigated conveyed that decisions of restricting the amount of animals hunted or to refrain from hunting selected species had been made. These restrictions were not directly a result of PSB, but were already set by the communities with the support of an external organisation (Instituto Quichua de Biotecnologia Sacha Supai) in communities C and D, with sanctions put in place and enforced (Vacacela Quishpe 2007). The dependency on ecotourism operations in community B, together with a conservation-minded leadership, instigated a strict and sanctioned no-hunting policy. In community A, interviewees stated that hunting was reduced, because they observed the disappearance of game animals. ' We have to preserve and not kill the animals anymore so that there is more, no more killing when they have offspring' (59-year-old male, community C) Except for community B, where strict conservation measures were in place well before joining PSB and monitoring was carried out via funds from the tourism operation, interviewees in the other three communities perceived that the number of animals have increased since they implemented conservation and monitoring funded by PSB. Respondents have attributed this observation not only to a reduction of poaching by outsiders since forest guards monitor the territory, but also to communal hunting restrictions which are not a direct result of PSB. As one interviewee stated, higher animal abundance is not only favourable in the long run, as hunting becomes potentially more sustainable but also reduces effort and time spent when hunting. ' Preserving animals in the forest is good and it serves us. If we kill [the animals] there won't be much left for the children. When you conserve animals come closer' (21year-old male, community D) 'It is good to conserve, without conservation there is no life. The animals have a right to live as well.' (28-year-old female leader of community A) These quotes illustrate the generally positive perception among the interviewees. Although this might be a result of a selection bias of interviewing designated forest guards and community leaders. Evidence repeatedly points towards the costs of conservation that are unequally distributed among community members (Kellert et al. 2000) , which is also a challenge for PSB at large (Krause et al. forthcoming) . To diminish conflicts over land, the studied communities own more land than is currently set aside for conservation and in these areas, typically close to the settlements, people have gardens and grow subsistence and partly cash crops.
Species use and alternatives to bushmeat
During our interviews, respondents stated that hunting in their communities is now exclusively for family consumption. Preferred species are primarily larger mammals such as the endangered 1 white-lipped peccary (Tayassu pecari) and the collared peccary (Pecari tajacu), large primates, such as the endangered woolly-monkey (Lagothrix poeppigii) and lowland paca (Cuniculus paca). Large birds, such as Salvin's curassow (Mitu salvini), and Spix's guan (Penelope jacquacu) are occasionally hunted. Freshwater fish from rivers and oxbows are an additional food source.
The majority of respondents were in favour of the idea to farm small game species (lowland paca and black agouti) in order to reduce hunting and substitute the loss of protein. A turtle breeding and an aquaculture project has been introduced to community D in 2006 by the Kichwa Institute for Biotechnology Sacha Supai (IQBSS), an external NGO that supports indigenous communities in capacity building and livelihood projects. However, the project is not being continued because the financial support from IQBSS stopped.
Discussion
More than just trees -moving forward with animal species conservation
Indigenous communities are different from other nonindigenous stakeholder groups, because they own large territories in the Ecuadorian Amazon with still wellpreserved forests, and they also enjoy different legal rights than non-indigenous people. Ecuador has signed the United Nations Declaration on the Right of indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and the International Labour Organization's convention 169. Recognizing the collective rights of indigenous people under the constitutional paragraph 57 (República del Ecuador 2008) limits the control, the Ministry of Environment can exert over decisions regarding land use and conservation practices in indigenous territories.
The PSB incentivises conservation, but allows for subsistence hunting, which respects indigenous people's rights and livelihoods. A complete ban on hunting would gain little support and would also be difficult to control. The PSB manual has very strict rules regarding land use in the conservation area, basically prohibiting any activities that change the vegetational cover, the natural behaviour or threaten the capacity to provide biodiversity habitat (see Table 1 ) (MAE 2012a) . What exactly this means is vague, because the main focus on vegetation cover as a proxy for other ecosystem services is unsuitable to achieve full biodiversity conservation since there is no indication that a seemingly intact forest cover equals the presence of animal species diversity or abundance (Redford 1992; Wilkie et al. 2011) .
The attempt to balance external top-down control and enforcement while to some extent respecting local livelihoods and indigenous people's rights in PSB involves trade-offs. Although we accept the importance of hunting for local consumption, we draw attention to the current conservation gap it involves -i.e., the focus on vegetational cover, and how the conservation gap can be overcome. In the following sections, we will discuss two main points that deserve particular consideration, firstly participatory forest monitoring and secondly, why the conservation gap represents a risk for achieving PSB's main environmental objectives of carbon storage and biodiversity protection in the long run.
Participatory forest and species monitoring
The role of local people and indigenous communities in tropical forest conservation and monitoring has been subject to debate with contested approaches and views regarding participation and sustainable use (Wilshusen et al. 2002) . The glorification of indigenous people and communities as inherently conservationist needs to be questioned (Nadasdy 2005; Hames 2007 ) and stereotyping communities as good or bad needs to be avoided (Wilshusen et al. 2002) , as more cautious conservation approaches are advocated (Wilshusen et al. 2002; Lu Holt 2005; Dove 2006 ). Agrawal and Gibson (1999) have underlined the mistake to ignore complex interests and processes within communities, and between communities and other actors.
As noted by Lu Holt (2005) , conservation is not a state of being but a social process that involves experience and learning which leads to the development of institutions and arrangements for conservation. Indigenous people's knowledge needs to be combined with scientific knowledge Table 4 . Advantages and limitations of participatory forest and biodiversity monitoring approaches. Adapted from Danielsen et al. (2007) , Danielsen et al. (2011) , Nielsen and Lund (2012) and Sheil and Lawrence (2004) .
Advantages Limitations
• (Agrawal 1995) . Excluding them from participation and knowledge production is neither socially equitable nor ecologically desirable (West 2006; Reed 2008) . Thus, although local participation in conservation efforts and monitoring represents a way to directly include local communities and local people and it is a useful and cost-effective method in developing countries (Danielsen et al. 2007 (Danielsen et al. , 2011 , it is not always a silver bullet (see Table 4 ) (Nielsen & Lund 2012) . Meijaard et al. (2011) state that community surveys to assess the status of species can also shed light on the socioecological relationships which remain largely concealed under standard biodiversity assessment methods. In a number of existing REDD+ pilot projects, carbon monitoring with the participation of local people and communities is being carried out (Skutsch 2011). However, most of these exclude the monitoring of animal species abundance or the extent of local bushmeat hunting. Sheil and Lawrence (2004) state several reasons why local participation is desirable. Firstly, it devolves competences to the owners of natural resources. Secondly, participatory approaches to conservation, such as forest and animal species monitoring, are crucial in order to overcome conflicts rooted in top-down conservation measures (protectionism), gain local support and to create a basis for enhanced capacity building. Thirdly, participatory monitoring can also help to encourage consultations and informed negotiations that bridge the gap between different stakeholder groups and include explicit acknowledgement of both local wishes and scientific understandings.
In the communities we visited, current capacitybuilding activities are limited. Up to now, there were no workshops for forest monitoring and a lack of recognition of the relevance of a systematic and regular monitoring scheme. We found that only two communities (A and B) had an organized monitoring system in place, while community D has designated guards but no clear and structured way of monitoring, let alone the capacity to access their respective conservation areas. In the case of community C, where no monitoring system was in place, the community cannot inform the authorities about intrusions or fires within the required five days. Without qualified forest guards who carry out regular patrols and having the necessary funding and equipment to communicate and to spend several days in the forest, it is almost impossible to detect land-use changes, illegal logging and poaching for the large areas of communities C and D. In order to facilitate monitoring efforts, it is important to identify areas with a higher risk of illegal logging and poaching, such as certain border areas and areas where access via navigable rivers and roads is easier.
To assure that the obligations of the PSB operating manual are met, frequent on-site monitoring of the AUC would be required. But this entails that land-use changes in the conservation area are detected. Yet, the control of compliance presumes functioning monitoring mechanisms, i.e., remote sensing, especially for the large and remote areas of communities C and D. The possibility of land-use changes being detected by PSB exerts an indirect top-down policing at the community level, but without the support of local people, especially if they are the recognized and rightful land owners, the likelihood that land-use changes are detected is rather small.
The participation of communal members in monitoring efforts is central; since state-driven monitoring capacities are limited and remote sensing using satellites is severely restricted in the Amazon due to weather conditions and cloud cover (Coral 2011) . Community members who take on the role of forest guards often know the forest better than people from outside, know how to access the conservation area, and can identify places more important for a specific species (e.g., parrot/tapir salt licks, special fruit trees, etc.), but also potential conflict areas where intrusions by third parties (poaching, logging and fishing) is more likely. Participation can strengthen the relationship that community members have with the forest in two ways. Designated forest guards receive a salary which is a direct monetary benefit to them and their families, symbolizing the value and benefit of conservation. Forest guards reporting back to other community members about their observations can lead to increased awareness and enhance people's perception regarding the importance of conservation.
However, there are limitations of the participatory monitoring approach that could lead to adverse effects on community institutions and social equity (see Table 4 ). Internal power dynamics can influence the processes of appointing forest guards, favouring elites which then can exert internal policing authority to community members who try to extract resources from the conservation area. In the set-up of participatory monitoring, it is important to be aware of resulting adverse impacts and to caution the information produced and communicated by forest guards under the locally based monitoring system (Nielsen & Lund 2012) . On one hand, the incentive method of PSB might reinforce already existing relationships between people and the natural resources they manage or foster new ones. On the other hand, PSB shifts control and enforcement of conservation to the communities, thus outsourcing a governmental responsibility of law-enforcement. Over-reporting on conservation outcomes by communities is a challenge, particularly when payments depend on conservation success. Although the PSB incentives are only linked to vegetation cover and not to animal species diversity or abundance, there might be a motivation for over-reporting in order to increase, for example, attractiveness for ecotourism or research. Nielsen and Lund (2012) caution against expectations from locally based monitoring. They argue that in processes of natural resources governance, power struggles over resources emerge and the information produced and communicated by monitoring schemes situated in such governance contexts cannot be understood outside the frame of the context. Local monitoring might also create a new form of control between communities and PSB over management rules and contract compliance. Moreover, in the cases presented here, community members are monitoring and controlling their own conservation areas and if changes are detected or intruders encountered, forest guards find themselves in a position in which they have to exert power over other people, which can be either outsiders or other community members violating the conservation rules. An escalation or proliferation of inequalities and conflict might be the result (Agrawal 2005; Andersson & Agrawal 2011) .
Communities, species conservation and REDD+
Indigenous territories in the Amazon contribute significantly to forest conservation and help curbing carbon emissions from deforestation (Ricketts et al. 2010; Van Dam 2011) . High fragmentation is a threat to the longterm survival of many species (Turner 1996; Laurance et al. 2000) and particularly large species, such as the lowland tapir (Tapirus terrestris) and jaguar (Panthera onca) need large areas to hunt and corridors to migrate (Weber & Rabinowitz 1996; Conde et al. 2010) . Because indigenous territories are covered by large contiguous forests, their territories provide more habitats and are generally more species-rich (Hill & Curran 2003) .
Indigenous people as recognized land owners are fundamental agents for conservation but also have responsibilities towards the ecosystems on their territories. Most interviewees showed awareness and expressed their worries with regards to the disappearance of certain animal species. They often referred to their children when talking about the importance for species conservation, a sign for consciousness regarding intergenerational equity. Building on this particular intergenerational aspect could strengthen long-term conservation if future workshops and awareness campaigns specifically aim at including younger community members and children.
From a conservation perspective, the imposition of community-derived and implemented sanctions is a positive sign hinting towards a direction that incorporates people's ecological knowledge into conservation practices rooted in local communities. However, care must be taken not to further marginalize the already marginalized groups, when for example, stricter hunting rules are implemented and enforced that affect a particular group within a community more than another. There is an evidence of a more critical view towards conservation and an inequitable distribution of costs and benefits in other communities that participate in PSB, where community members claim to experience limitations for their families' livelihoods due to loss of access to new arable land or other forest resources while the benefits accrue at the community level (Krause et al. forthcoming) .
All four sampled communities had already introduced hunting restrictions before participation in PSB. People's awareness about the conservation of certain game species was not a result of joining PSB per se, but of the realization that the abundance of game species decreased due to excessive game harvesting for consumption and commercialization or poaching by third parties. However, with their participation in PSB communities are, at least theoretically, in a better position to finance and exert stricter control over their territories. In particular, we found that communities A and B were more conservation-minded, mainly because people in both communities are less dependent on forest resource extraction than in the case of communities C and D. While community A has a relatively small population and is not permanently settled, community B heavily depends on their tourism venture. Tourism in community B was encouraged and is driven strongly by conservationminded leaders, with the majority of community members being engaged and employed in tourism. Thus, for successful and inclusive species conservation to be more than lip service, generating alternative income-generating options are important.
The main constraint towards an evaluation of the extent to which conservation actually has a positive impact on populations of the rainforest megafauna is the lack of ecological baseline data on species abundance and diversity in the PSB areas. Current monitoring activities (in and ex situ) are limited to vegetation cover, and as of yet there is no methodology in PSB for interviewing community members on their hunting behaviour or their observations regarding species populations in the conservation areas. Terborgh et al. (2008) suggest that the best, and perhaps only way to prevent compositional change and probable loss of diversity in tropical tree communities is to maintain an intact animal species composition and abundance. Where this is not feasible and is socially undesired, the implementation of catch limits for vulnerable species (e.g., tapir) can be one option when the loss of protein and income is substituted by other means (Franzen 2006) , such as breeding of game species and aquaculture.
Looking at the larger picture and going back to the implication on a potential REDD+ mechanism, the existing concept of leakage needs to be reframed and expanded. From a local and regional perspective of species conservation, leakage needs to be understood not only as a shift of logging to other areas without protection status, but also as a shift of hunting efforts away from current conservation areas. Although we did not explicitly study it in our research, people in the studied communities told us that since the beginning of PSB hunting efforts have shifted to other areas that are not included in PSB. Figure 2 is a conceptual model which exemplifies the linkage of PSB regulations that restrict hunting, prohibit logging and require maintenance of forest vegetation cover to animal diversity and long-term carbon stocks. Unregulated and unmanaged, hunting and logging activities lead to a decrease in animal species diversity and abundance, which in turn has the potential to affect biomass carbon stocks in the long run. Currently, participatory forest monitoring is not part of PSB's regulations, but if included and developed in conjunction with communities, it can strengthen the regulatory demands that prohibit logging and commercial hunting. Forest carbon monitoring, reporting and verification is an important aspect under current REDD+ mechanisms and linked with community participation for monitoring animal diversity represents a step to close the conservation gap. However, the ecological interactions, such as seed dispersal by animal species and the effect on tree diversity, need to be more strongly taken into account in order to avoid the long-term effects of decreased animal diversity and its impact on biomass carbon stocks. Here, the participation and goodwill of local communities and people is a prerequisite in controlling hunting restrictions, implementing monitoring systems and starting species inventories. The current conservation gap in PSB, is exemplified by its primary focus on vegetation cover, and signifies that participatory forest and biodiversity monitoring are weak.
We therefore propose that in order to close the conservation gap, community forest guards not only control for illegal logging or encroachment in the conservation area but also conduct animal species surveys to detect changes to species composition and abundance resulting from, for example, poaching, habitat loss or overharvesting. This requires forest guards to obtain the skills and necessary knowledge about and the basic equipment for monitoring, such as GPS, boats and motors for river transportation, satellite phones and binoculars. In two of the four communities we visited, knowledge about monitoring is weak and basic equipment is lacking. Here, in particular, PSB can start capacity-building through workshops with designated forest guards and the wider community.
During monitoring rounds, forest guards can develop inventories of certain species that are indicators of overhunting and other human disturbances, such as large mammals and birds (for example, T. terrestris, T. pecari, L. poeppigii, A. belzebuth and M. salvini) . The inventory should also include location (GPS), date and time, the number of individuals encountered, as well as any additional information (offspring, sex, wounds from snares, diseases, etc.). However, since many of these species are elusive and difficult to encounter, tracks and other signs of existence (e.g., droppings) should be included. Focusing on more vulnerable areas along rivers and roads is a more efficient strategy in larger territories where the monitoring efforts over the expanse of the whole area are infeasible. Once established, these basic inventories can provide valuable information on which more detailed biodiversity inventories can be built. Based on the preliminary inventory, changes to animal species diversity and abundance in the conservation area can be tracked in the long run. Countermeasures can be taken when declines in species abundance are detected, such as stricter hunting regulations or targeted patrols in areas where external poaching is detected or likely to occur.
Conclusion
We have analysed the current status of species conservation and participatory forest monitoring in four indigenous communities that are part of the PSB programme in the Ecuadorian Amazon. We show that there is a conservation gap in the current design of PSB, which leaves out animal species conservation and participatory monitoring as important components for successful long-term forest conservation. Our findings support the idea that including local people is necessary for successful conservation, not only because they are the rightful owners of the territories as in our case but also because they know the conservation areas best. More direct efforts and capacity building are needed to enhance the possibility for local people's participation in forest and species monitoring. Without their participation in monitoring, the long-term effectiveness of conservation will be questionable.
Strengthening animal species conservation contributes directly to the objective of socio-economic development via the engagement of local people in monitoring activities. If we learned something from PSB's work and our observations and interviews, it is that the attitude towards conservation in general depends on the possibilities people in communities have to make a living, and on the extent to which community leaders are supporting conservation ideas.
Understanding the impacts of local subsistence hunting on long-term tree diversity, tree composition and biomass carbon storage requires further research. Prohibiting commercial hunting is an important first step, but more investigation is needed to identify the long-term effects on forest health and resilience by subsistence hunting. Our results can inform the further design and implementation of potential REDD+ projects that aim to engage local people and to achieve environmental benefits beyond the mitigation of climate change.
However, caution needs to be exerted to the social impacts as a result of implementing community-based monitoring, such as unevenly distributed costs of conservation and internal policing of community members by forest guards. These social impacts and the problem of leakage of hunting to other areas which are not included in PSB are a concern requiring more attention in the future. Note 1. All species conservation statuses are taken from Tiria (2011) and refer to the species conservation status in Ecuador, if not otherwise stated.
